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This article outlines the author's experience with 'diversifying' a provincial feminist organization in 1993, and 
assesses that experience in light of competing feminist theories. 
RESUME 
Cet article passe en revue l'experience de l'auteure avec le processus de 'diversification' d'un organisme feministe 
provincial en 1993. L'auteure evalue les resultats en tenant compte de diverses theories feministes qui se font 
concurrence. 
In recent years feminist groups 
representing "women's interests" in Canada 
have faced serious challenges from women 
who have historically been excluded from full 
participation. Several groups have responded 
with commitments to outreach and 
"diversification," to getting women with 
greater diversity of race, class, sexual 
orientation, abilities, age, and so on involved 
in their organizations. Unfortunately, too few 
of these groups have documented their 
processes of "diversification." Fewer still 
have reflected analytically on these processes, 
to understand them better, and to explore 
exactly what happened— something there is 
often no time for while in the process. In this 
paper I will use current feminist theories, 
which are multiple and contested, to make 
some sense of a diversification process I was 
involved with at the Nova Scotia Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women. 
I not only want to use theory to make 
sense of experience; I also want to use that 
experience to examine contemporary 
contesting approaches to feminist theory and 
praxis. What things do they bring to light, or 
leave in shadow? How are they helpful, and 
how less helpful in understanding our work as 
feminist activists? What are their political 
implications? I will begin with description: a 
brief accounting of what happened at the 
Status of Women, as I observed and perceived 
it. I will offer an analysis of the process and 
wil l explore the approaches of 1) feminist 
praxis rooted in a notion of shared identity; 2) 
feminist praxis focused on notions of 
difference or diversity; and 3) feminist politics 
that incorporate or emerge from what I would 
call postmodern feminism. 
"DIVERSIFYING" THE ADVISORY 
COUNCIL O N THE STATUS OF W O M E N 
From December 1993 through August 
1994, I was involved in an intense series of 
meetings with the Nova Scotia Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women. The 
Advisory Council is an organization "at arms 
length" from the provincial government, 
established in 1977 to monitor women's issues 
and to advise the government on "matters of 
interest and concern to the women of Nova 
Scotia."2 Historically, the Council has been 
perceived as rather exclusive. The members, 
all volunteers except for the President, are 
chosen to represent the twelve Federal ridings 
in Nova Scotia. Until 1993 there had never 
been a First Nations woman nor an "out" 
lesbian on the Council. There had been only 
two or three Black women3, one woman with 
disabilities, and few low-income women on 
Council. Acadian 4 women had been 
represented on Council mainly because a 
significant proportion of one riding is Acadian. 
In short, Council members had largely been 
White, middle-class, heterosexual, ablebodied, 
and English-speaking. The Status of Women 
was regarded by many as an elite government 
body, filled with government appointees. 
In the fall of 1993 the Council had 
committed itself to a "process of 
diversification," to getting women on the 
Council who represented the diversity of 
women in Nova Scotia. I was invited to join a 
"Community Advisory Committee," a group of 
women who would help guide the Advisory 
Council through this diversification process. I 
was there representing "the lesbians" (though 
I didn't find that out right away). After a 
painful three-month process of strategic 
planning, the Advisory Council and "the 
community women" developed a Selection 
Committee whose task was to devise a 
selection process that would recruit women 
from the groups that had historically been 
excluded from the Council. The five of us on 
the Selection Committee worked together from 
April to August 1994.5 
There were now seven vacant Council 
seats and we had to work out a selection 
process quickly. We started by designating 
seats for the "target groups" of women; then 
we would ascertain regional representation and 
rural/urban balance. We decided to allocate the 
"designated seats" on the basis of who most 
needed voices on Council. The most 
thoroughly alienated were Black and Native 
women, who were designated two seats each. 
Lesbians, Acadian women, and women with 
disabilities each were designated one seat, for 
a total of seven. 
We developed an advertisement 
specifically inviting applications from 
members of the targeted groups6. We created 
an application form asking women to tell us 
about their connections to women's 
communities, their connections to their own 
community (however they defined that), and 
their personal life experiences they felt would 
help them on the Advisory Council. We also 
wrote a statement about the changing 
composition of the Council and what we were 
looking for in applicants. 
This was when the process came 
closest to breaking down. A l l five of us agreed 
on some crucial attributes like team work, 
listening ability, agreement with the mission 
statement, interest in women's issues, and 
commitment to working against racism, 
homophobia and discrimination against 
disability or income or class. But we could not 
agree about abortion. 
One of the committee members was a 
long-term abortion rights activist. I had 
worked at abortion clinics and was strongly 
pro-choice. And the staff had sent a strong 
request that pro-choice be part of the 
qualifications we looked for in new CQuncil 
members. In a sense, it was a measure of 
feminism for us —a "real" feminist will be 
pro-choice on abortion. When it was 
suggested, we all pretty much agreed. Then 
after a pause, the one Black woman in the 
room said something like, "If you say they 
have to be pro-choice, you won't get women 
who represent the Black community on this 
Council." 
Of course. The indigenous Black 
community in Nova Scotia has a long history 
and tradition in the African Baptist Church. In 
addition, the history of Black women in North 
America, a history which includes slavery, 
forced breeding, and forced sterilizations, as 
well as exclusion from the pro-choice 
movement, has made the issue of abortion a 
complex and highly charged one for many 
Black women7. Many members of the Black 
community in Nova Scotia are not pro-choice 
on abortion. 
We very quickly reached a point where no 
one was willing to budge. We were all making 
"bottom-line" statements: "It's a bottom line 
for me. Council members have to be 
pro-choice;" "If you insist on the abortion 
thing, you will not get any good Black 
women." In my mind, and probably others', 
was the awareness that the same position was 
quite possibly true of First Nations women, 
too, as well as Acadian women. In both of 
those cultures in Nova Scotia, religions play 
important roles, religions which oppose 
abortion. In my mind, i f in no one else's, was 
the awareness that those same religions (and to 
some extent the Black, Acadian and 
Aboriginal communities) would also be 
against homosexuality (against me). We left 
that meeting totally discouraged, afraid we had 
reached an impasse. 
When we returned a couple of weeks 
later we were able to resolve this impasse. We 
simply reframed the issue, focusing on 
reproductive rights, rather than abortion. We 
agreed to a wording that read: 
prospective Council members 
should be prepared to support 
women's reproductive rights, 
however that might be 
defined by women in the 
context of their lives, their 
cultures and their 
communities. While in some 
cases that might mean access 
to abortion services, for other 
women it might mean access 
to midwifery, safe 
contraception, artificial 
insemination, adequate sex 
education, or opposing 
coerced sterilizations. 
With this agreement we sent over 800 
application forms around the province. In 
response, we got 164 applications, of which 52 
were from the designated groups. With very 
little disagreement, we short-listed 14 women 
for the seven vacant seats, and sent that list to 
the Interview Committee. On August 31, 1994, 
seven new members were appointed to the 
Council. The new Nova Scotia Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women included 
women from the Black, Acadian, aboriginal, 
lesbian and disability communities, as well as 
low-income women and single mothers. 
FEMINIST PRAXIS: ISSUES OF IDENTITY 
A N D DIFFERENCE 
There are three general approaches in 
feminist praxis, the weaving together of theory 
and practice, that I would like to look at using 
this experience as a lens: 1) praxis focused on 
identity; 2) praxis focused on 
difference/diversity; and 3) praxis emerging 
from or incorporating postmodern feminism. 
FEMINIST PRAXIS FOCUSED ON A 
S H A R E D IDENTITY 
In its early days, the Women's Liberation 
Movement established the remarkable notion 
that women are oppressed as Women. It 
argued for a globally shared sisterhood—a 
notion that has since been shown to be 
ethnocentric, essentialist and ahistorical. It was 
centered in the lives of a select group of 
women who assumed their own experiences 
were common to all women, and constructed 
a sort of generic female "essence," an essential 
identity of Woman. Politics centered around 
an essential identity risk excluding everyone 
who does not quite fit. Inevitably, defining an 
identity creates and maintains inside/outside 
distinctions (Young, 1990). It constructs Us 
and Them: We are the ones who are not Them. 
Not only does feminist praxis focused on 
shared identity tend to be essentialist and 
exclusionary, but there is also a tendency to 
"ontologize" identity. That is, feminism 
becomes a matter of being rather than doing. I 
recall times, especially in my earliest feminist 
days, when I prefaced almost every statement 
with "As a feminist, I . . .." I think of it as 
capital-F Feminist, when being "A Feminist" 
became the core of my self-identity. 
Australian Anna Yeatman (1993) 
argues that the tendency to ontologize identity 
seems almost inevitable in the politics engaged 
in by emancipatory movements. She argues 
that "emancipatory voices," voices for 
liberation, exist only in relation to governing 
politics. They exist solely in the challenge 
they pose to inequality and exclusion. Thus 
feminism exists only in relation, only in its 
acts of challenge to governing powers. It is not 
something one can simply be, without enacting 
that challenge. 
Yet participants in emancipatory 
struggles often take up their positions of 
opposition as ontological identities, as 
conditions of being not necessarily attached to 
enacting opposition. As Yeatman says, "Thus, 
the feminist lives her life as a feminist and 
subjects all aspects of her everyday life to the 
political discourse of emancipation.... [M]uch 
of the time [this] involves the inappropriate 
subjection of social and personal life to what 
becomes a pseudo-politics, namely a politics 
without contestation" (Yeatman, 1993: 
236-237). In other words, my feminist voice is 
only really relevant when it is contesting 
exclusion from the dominant discourse. If I 
assume simply being feminist is political, 
whether or not I contest the status quo, I 
engage in a kind of ineffective life-style 
politics (Kauffman, 1990). 
Yeatman (1993) also argues that 
grounding emancipatory movements in fixed 
identities is likely to result in "no-change 
politics." As those in emancipatory 
movements ontologize their oppositional 
status as identity, making oppositionality a 
matter of who they are rather than what they 
do. the political contest between them and 
those who govern becomes based on the 
interests of each group, interests which are 
materially based and fixed. If my opposition to 
the status quo is a matter of who I am, and 
your opposition to me is a matter of who you 
are, we can really only ever exist in 
opposition. There is little room for change. 
This limiting of the potential for change 
seems to occur when we take on our marginal 
positions as identities and cling to them 
tenaciously. Thus at the Status of Women it 
was crucial at several points that women be 
able to let go of our singular identities that 
defined how we were different from each other 
(often the very identity that we were asked to 
be there for) in order to find ways to work 
together. This took a certain amount of trust 
that the others were well-intentioned, and were 
not following a hidden agenda. 
Despite its limitations, identity politics 
was built in to the process we were engaged in 
at the Status of Women. The very name of that 
organization implies unity among women as 
Women. Whether we liked it or not, the 
mandate of the organization assumes a shared 
identity. 
FEMINIST PRAXIS FOCUSED ON 
DIFFERENCE/DIVERSITY 
Feminist praxis focused on diversity is 
epitomized by the caucuses of the early 1980's 
(Findlay, 1993). Seemingly every women's 
group, conference, or organization had 
caucuses, for lesbians, for women of colour, 
for all those who found themselves outside the 
implicit or explicit definition of Generic 
Woman. This move added a crucial dimension 
to feminist praxis. Yet this politics of 
difference still risks falling into notions of 
fixed and singular identities, especially if it 
avoids examining the interconnections among 
differences. This is especially the case if 
decisions about which categories of difference 
count are determined by the categories on the 
grant application form, or the availability of 
cheap space for the conference, or the need of 
funders to have "stats" on who attended the 
event (Khayatt, 1994). 
What often seems to happen in practice is 
that privileged groups tend to ignore their own 
specificity, so that their own views appear 
neutral while those "other" women are 
characterized by their "diversity." (Gunew and 
Yeatman, 1993: xvii). The dominant group 
maintains a singular identity (Generic 
Woman), while "diverse" women have a race, 
a class, a sexual orientation, specific physical 
or mental abilities. White women do not have 
to problematize their own Whiteness; race is a 
Black or First Nations issue. Straight women 
do not have to problematize their 
heterosexuality; "sexuality" has become 
equated with lesbianism, just as "gender" 
usually means "women." Black, Aboriginal 
and immigrant women have a race. Lesbians 
have a sexuality. Working-class women have 
a class. Everyone else is neutral. 
This dynamic got played out over and 
over again in "diversifying" the Status of 
Women. There were the Generic Women, and 
then there were the Others who came to the 
work complicated by race and class and 
sexuality and disability and culture and 
history. We Others were even named as 
outsiders; we were referred to as "The 
Community Women," as if none of the staff or 
Council members lived in communities. There 
was a very strong sense that we brought with 
us issues that were from the outside, external 
to the usual operation of the Council. Even 
among the Community Advisory Committee, 
we locked ourselves and each other into 
singular categories of difference that reflected 
what issues we brought to the discussion, and 
we did not problematize, or draw upon, the 
other aspects of ourselves. 
For example at the very first meeting 
we went around the boardroom table while 
each woman introduced herself and said who 
she was there representing. None of us gave 
more than one category. A woman with 
disabilities, for example, did not say she was 
representing White, heterosexual, middle-class 
women with disabilities. Most of our 
categories were apparent—the Black women 
represented Black women, and so on. As my 
turn was approaching, I had to decide whether 
to "come out" as lesbian or not. I had not been 
told I was there representing lesbians. Perhaps 
I was there as a young woman? Or an 
anti-violence activist? Or to represent White, 
middle-class, educated women? I felt a rising 
anger that none of the other women had named 
themselves as heterosexual (assuming they 
were. . .) yet I was expected to name my 
sexuality and define that as my issue, my 
constituency. And yet, I, like the other White 
women, did not name my race—that was left to 
the Black and Aboriginal women. Nor did any 
of us identify ourselves as able-bodied. As 
often happens in a feminist praxis rooted in 
difference, we locked ourselves and each other 
into singular categories of difference. Thus 
even when we deliberately invoke "difference" 
we can easily be pushed back into us-them 
dualisms; when we employ categories of 
identity without allowing for their complexity, 
we tend to reify a single component of our or 
another's identity. 
Gabriel and Scott (1993) suggest that 
women from dominant groups avoid coming to 
terms with our own sources of privilege 
because we want to cling to oppression to 
validate our oppositional politics. The lines 
between oppressed and oppressor are often 
clearly drawn, and many of us in emancipatory 
movements want to stay on the oppressed side 
at all times, to enjoy solidarity. We have 
identified ourselves as "the powerless" and so 
we do not examine the places where we hold 
power. I preferred to name my lesbianism and 
leave my Whiteness unspoken. 
FEMINIST PRAXIS EMERGING F R O M A 
POSTMODERN FEMINISM 
Both the desire for unity in a common 
identity and the desire for unitary categories of 
difference fail to acknowledge the multiplicity 
of identities among individuals, as well as 
within individuals. Unitary categories can only 
exist through the exclusion or suppression of 
differences. We are never just women; we all, 
always, have a race, a social class, sexuality, a 
range of physical and mental abilities, as well 
as a host of other personal and collective 
elements of history and culture that make up 
who we are. Postmodern feminism emphasizes 
that our identities are multiple and fragmented, 
constantly shifting, and internally 
contradictory. It allows us to name and explore 
our multiple identities, using categories of 
difference where they are useful. It allows us 
to explore how aspects of our identities may be 
sources of both oppression and privilege at the 
same time. 
For example, sometimes oppressed 
marginal statuses can become a form of power. 
In the planning process at the Status of 
Women my status as a lesbian gave me a 
certain authority that I was able to use, i f I 
chose to, to silence other women who were not 
deemed to be "marginal". In one sense my 
lesbianism gave me a measure of privilege, if 
not power, in this process. It gave me a 
privileged location from which to speak, a 
strange sort of "more oppressed than thou" 
privilege. At the same time, aspects of my 
identity other than my lesbianism are socially 
privileged—my Whiteness, my education, my 
articulateness, my knowledge of feminist 
processes. I could, if I chose, use these aspects 
to get my way, virtually unchallenged because 
I was a "marginal Other." To some extent, my 
"marginalized" lesbianism permitted me to 
enact other forms of dominance unchecked. 
The notion of identities being 
contradictory and constantly shifting is, to my 
mind, what is most valuable in postmodern 
feminism. It allows for the possibility of a 
politics based in identities that do not lock us 
into fixed, unitary positions—a state of partial 
recognition where we are required to talk on 
cue when the lesbian issue is raised, or the 
Black issue, or the disability issue (Truame, 
1994). Refusing to lock ourselves or each 
other into such partial and fixed identities 
offers the potential for truly new ways of 
working together and understanding our work 
together toward equality. In our daily lives and 
in our politics we all constantly negotiate 
among multiple subject positions, sometimes 
foregrounding one, sometimes another—and 
sometimes retreating to whatever common 
identity we find we can share simply to get on 
with the work. 
At the Status of Women, this was 
highlighted by the tensions that occurred 
around the issue of abortion. We could have 
gone into that with a rigid identity politics, in 
which we said "we are all feminists and 
feminism is pro-choice and therefore all new 
Council members must be pro-choice on 
abortion". We could have laid down a 
bottom-line, and as was predicted, we 
probably would not have got Black women on 
Council who were very connected to their 
community. Had we remained rooted in a 
politics of difference that relied on singular 
categories of difference we still could not have 
reached compromise. I, as a lesbian, might 
have remained adamant that sexual freedom 
was central and therefore, pro-choice on 
abortion was unnegotiable. The woman who 
was a long-time abortion rights activist might 
have simply found herself unable to budge. 
And the Black woman on the committee might 
have intensified her refusal to support a 
process that required women to be pro-choice, 
since she herself—and many in her community-
-could not support this position.8 
The compromise that we reached in the 
end came from allowing ourselves to hold 
multiple, shifting identities. I was trying to 
find my reaction to the claim that, basically, 
our pro-choice requirement was racist, or at 
least ethnocentric (centered in White notions 
of feminism). I shifted among my identity as a 
pro-choice activist, my identity as a daughter 
of Catholic anti-choice activists, my support 
for anti-racist politics, my lesbian fear of the 
homophobia often attached to anti-choice 
positions. Mostly though, that first day, I hung 
on to my Whiteness, in which I felt somewhat 
neutral about the whole thing: she had a race 
issue with this abortion thing. It was up to her 
to sort it out. Or, at best, it was up to us to find 
a way around this obstacle she had erected in 
the name of race. 
It was when I spoke with other lesbians, 
between meetings, that a solution emerged for 
me. When I foregrounded my lesbian identity, 
abortion was simply not a major issue for me. 
It isn't for most lesbians (we don't tend to get 
pregnant accidentally). But access to artificial 
insemination is a salient issue. Lesbians are 
often excluded from insemination services. At 
the next meeting, when other women began to 
consider the reproductive issues that are 
central for them, in their communities, 
abortion was just one of many. For Black and 
Aboriginal women it may be the frequency 
with which they are prescribed contraceptives 
with dubious safety records. For women with 
disabilities it may be simply being considered 
sexual at all, or fighting selective abortion of 
"defective" fetuses. For some women, access 
to abortion is central. Framed in terms of 
reproductive rights, when we were all willing 
to let go of singular identities and allow our 
shirting multiple identities free rein, we found 
a way to work through what might have been 
an impasse. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This analysis highlights some limitations 
of different approaches to feminist praxis. 
Feminist praxis too heavily focused on a 
shared identity tends to be essentialist and 
therefore exclusionary. There is a tendency to 
turn oppositionality (which is always a social 
relation) into ontological identity. The result 
may be a pseudopolitics and/or a "no change" 
politics. Feminist praxis too heavily focused 
on notions of difference and diversity is 
limited by a tendency to see only the "diverse" 
women as having a race, a sexuality, a class, 
and so on. There is also a tendency to lock 
ourselves and each other into rigid, singular 
categories of difference. And we tend to cling 
to areas where our status situates us among 
"the oppressed" rather than examining the 
areas in which we hold privilege and power. 
An advantage I see in postmodern 
feminist praxis is its allowance for shifting and 
contradictory identities. It may leave us 
temporarily located in identity politics or 
politics of difference. At times it is necessary 
to find the common ground, the identity that 
"we all share as women" to insist that there are 
still structural and systemic factors that lead to 
women's oppression as women vis a vis men. 
At times it is necessary to hold onto 
difference, to fight for your cause, to claim 
authenticity for your position—even while 
questioning the possibility of authenticity. 
Postmodern feminist politics takes up these 
approaches strategically. 
Postmodern feminist praxis can enable 
us to examine simultaneous aspects of power 
and oppression, without locking us into fixed 
unitary positions of shared identity or 
incompatible difference. We may take up a 
subject position when it is useful, and insist on 
our freedom to take up a contradictory position 
at another time. We can refuse to be just a 
woman with disabilities, just a lesbian, just a 
Black woman. We can insist on our 
complexities, our multiple selves, and our 
freedom to shift among those positions 
strategically. 
ENDNOTES 
1. I am grateful to the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council 
of Canada for financial assistance. 
Thanks to the reviewers for their 
helpful comments. Finally, many 
of the ideas worked out in this 
paper are the product of 
discussions with Bethan A . Lloyd. 
"Ownership" of ideas seems 
unfathomable; I cannot possibly 
sort out my ideas from hers. 
Nonetheless, I take full 
responsibility for the words and 
interpretations I have committed to 
paper here. 
2. In practice this has included 
advising the Minister Responsible 
for the Status of Women, bringing 
issues to his or her attention, 
conducting research, bringing issues 
to the attention of the media, 
responding to the media, and 
establishing a fieldwork program to 
work with women in rural areas of 
the province. 
3. I recognize the political implications 
of using the term 'African-Canadian' 
rather than 'Black.' However, in 
Nova Scotia in 1993/94, 'Black' 
predominated and was the term used 
by all participants throughout this 
process, so I use it here. 
4. Acadians are French-speaking 
Canadians who have lived in certain 
areas of the Maritime provinces for 
centuries. 
5. Throughout this brief descriptive 
section of this paper I am skipping 
rapidly through decision-making 
processes that were long and 
difficult.Over and over again through 
this process we expressed our 
frustration at being torn between the 
pragmatic need to get things done 
and the knowledge that how we 
accomplished things was far from 
perfect. 
6. There had been long and heated 
debate during the Strategic Planning 
about whether to have women's 
groups from specific communities 
nominate Council members or even 
select them.Though the other 
"community women" and I argued 
for this, it was finally defeated. It 
was seen as too complex and too 
divisive for the community groups. 
I still question whether this 
approach was unpopular because it 
placed too much power in the hands 
of the community groups. 
7. Phil Okeke's comments at this 
conference were helpful here. 
8. I am using the issue of abortion as 
an example; it most clearly shows 
the struggles we were engaged in. 
But our struggles were not about 
abortion or abortion politics. We 
were all there as representatives of 
identity-based categories, and I 
argue that our struggles were about 
how to work with those identities. 
In my view, abortion was simply the 
issue that forced us to grapple with 
our differences. Reaching consensus 
requires naming and engaging with 
difference, rather than denying and 
ignoring it. 
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